This paper investigates the budget transparency of Croatian local governments, i.e., the relationship between the open local budget index (OLBI) and a set of economic, political and socio--cultural variables. It uses a unique panel database of all 128 cities and 428 municipalities in 2015 and 2016. To examine the differences among the samples and years and to determine whether the different samples have different driving forces, a regression analysis based on a Poisson distribution is used. In the total (cities and municipalities) and city samples, average income per capita (p.c.) is the most important determinant of the OLBI, which confirms Ferejohn's principal-agent model. At the municipality level, the findings indicate that political variables (ideology and political competition) are the factors that play the most important role, which is in line with the principal-agent and legitimacy theories. Findings point out to the necessity of reconsidering the number of local governments, particularly smaller ones lacking the capacity for maintaining basic budget transparency standards and to motivate citizens to demand and local governments to offer more budget transparency.
INTRODUCTION
Budget transparency (BT) is recognized as an important feature of fiscal policy. It allows citizens to obtain budget information and contribute to the more efficient collection of public funds and supply of public goods and services, thereby increasing governments' accountability and citizens' trust and reducing opportunities for corruption (Alt & Lowry, 2010; Hameed, 2005; Khagram, Fung, & de Renzio, 2013; Kopits & Craig, 1998; Piotrowski & van Ryzin, 2007) .
In this paper, local governments' (LGs') BT is defined as the ability for citizens to obtain online information about LGs' budgets that is complete, accurate, timely and presented in an understandable form. Budget information available on
LGs' official websites is analysed because Internet reporting is fast, with low cost, wide reach and flexible formats (Debreceny, Gray, & Rahman, 2002) ; consequently, it has been increasingly used in addition to paper-based budget reporting.
The Croatian government is committed to promoting both national and local government BT, as demonstrated by signing the Open Government Partnership initiative and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) issuing a recommendation to all
LGs to annually publish five key local budget documents (budget proposal, enacted budget, citizens' budget, mid-year and end-year reports) on their official websites (Open Government Partnership, 2012) . This recommendation was reiterated in several other acts and instructions of the MoF, but sanctions for not publishing these local budget documents were never introduced.
The open local budget index (OLBI) used in this work measures only the number of key local budget documents that each LG has annually timely published on its official website Ott, Bronić, Petrušić, & Stanić, 2016) . The yearly OLBI for each LG ranges from 0 to 5 (zero if it has not published any document, and five if it has published all five). The OLBI is available for all 576 Croatian LGs for two years. This already-constructed OLBI is used as a source of secondary data that can also be used by other researchers for their own samples; thus, its construction is not a focus of this paper. This measure and the approach taken in this paper can be generalized beyond Croatia, enabling other researchers to conduct similar work in other contexts.
The levels of LGs' OLBIs vary widely Ott et al., 2016) , and despite improvements in the OLBI's overall average level (from 1.75 in 2015 to 2.35 in 2016 for all LGs), it is still far from satisfactory. In 2016, on average, the most transparent were counties (4.3), whereas cities were less transparent (3.05), and municipalities were the least transparent (2.04).
The aim of this study is to explain such differences. Accordingly, two main research goals were established: (i) to empirically identify the variables influencing the level of the OLBI for the total 'population' (cities+municipalities) and at two different samples and (ii) to identify and measure the differences among various samples and/or years. Based on a literature review and the researchers' own reasoning, a selected set of economic, political and socio-cultural determinants of BT on the municipality and city levels are examined. This paper does not address counties because that sample and the variation in their OLBI values are too small.
Since "the problems related to transparency are more frequent at local level, as local politicians are usually more discrete when it comes to taking decisions" (Araujo & Tejedo-Romero, 2015, p. 2) , and since researchers have not been able to provide consistent conclusions due to heterogeneous results regarding LG BT determinants (Alcaide Muñoz, Rodríguez Bolívar, & López Hernández, 2017) , this paper aims to clarify the previously identified determinants. It can be distinguished from the previous literature because it (i) uses a novel methodology (Poisson distribution), (ii) uses a rather large sample of 556 LGs in a fiscally centralized, post-socialist country, and (iii) except for Laswad, Fisher, and Oyelere (2005) it is the only research that looks at only whether LGs are timely publishing budgetary documents without checking the quality of data. Citizens of fiscally centralized, post-socialist countries probably care less about BT, because LGs themselves provide fewer public goods compared to the ones in fiscally decentralized countries. Furthermore, despite the alarming public debt and an unstable political situation, citizens seem to be neglecting their role in the budgetary process. In the "spirit of socialism", they regard public money as both "everybody's and nobody's" . Thus, without the sense of ownership, there is no incentive for citizens to actively participate in the budget process, which provides extensive manoeuvring space for opportunistic behaviour and rent-seeking activities for incumbents. This is tied to the previously established opportunistic behaviour of incumbents in LGs' election cycles (Mačkić, 2014; Vuković, 2017) . This paper is also an attempt to improve practices which help citizens to participate in LGs' public finances.
The next sections provide the theoretical framework, a literature review, the data and methodology, the empirical results and the conclusions.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF BUDGET TRANSPARENCY
From the political economy perspective, BT is ultimately a question of incumbents' credibility, which depends on institutions and incentives. In Croatia, BT represents a credible commitment of a local incumbent within a given national institutional framework (Budget Act (2012) , the Act on the Right of Access to Information (2013) , and the MoF's recommendation with regard to issuing five key local budget documents) and incentives that arise from the Institute of Public Finance's (IPF) yearly ratings of LGs Ott et al., 2016) . The list can be further expanded with economic fundamentals, demographic information and the ideological stance of the incumbent (Alt, 2002) . Besley (2006) summarizes the literature on the political economy of public finance to median voter models and conflict of interest models (governors vs the governed). The latter recognize the limited ability to restrain the power of non--benevolent incumbents. One way to improve resource allocation is through increased transparency and accountability. The principal-agent model highlights that elections play a limited role in restraining incumbents' behaviour and/or in selecting a "good" politician. However, more disclosure can weaken the information asymmetry and decrease such problems for citizens (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . Therefore, the principal-agent theory links more disclosure of budget information with better public-sector governance (Benito & Bastida, 2009) .
Two formal principal-agent models have been developed within the political economy literature regarding transparency, policy choices, and incumbent accountability. In Ferejohn's (1999) model, transparency is endogenous, i.e., the incumbent (agent) chooses how to make evident his actions to the voters (principal). Since it assumes that the incumbent is compensated by rents that are proportional to the scale of government, the result is straightforward. Agents have incentives to choose above zero transparency, leading to larger budgets and thus more rents compared to a situation in which most of their actions remain hidden from the principal. It also assumes that the principal uses so-called action monitoring when evaluating agents.
In Besley's (2006) model, bad and good agents decide on tax policy issues in more or less transparent situations. The former appropriates rents and thus maximizes private gains; the latter maximizes the social welfare. Depending on the equilibrium of a two-period model (pooled, separate and "hybrid"), various levels of public goods and rent extraction are recorded. The model yields discipline and selection which are at the heart of the agency problem and arise due to increased transparency. Higher transparency reduces extraction of rents; whereas selection allows voters to throw bad incumbents out of office.
The neo-institutional theory argues that organizations respond to external pressures (laws or public opinion), adopting legitimate and socially acceptable structures and practices, resulting in increasingly homogenous practices and structures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Rodríguez Bolívar, Alcaide Muñoz, & López Hernández, 2013) . Information disclosure becomes a symbol of trust and modernity to project an image of good governance and transparency (Rodríguez Bolívar et al., 2013) .
Similarly, the legitimacy theory argues that if their legitimacy is threatened, organizations will disclose information to promote organizational legitimacy (Deegan, 2002; Patten, 1992) . Consequently, increased BT can also lead to increased legitimacy of representative decision-making (Araujo & Tejedo-Romero, 2016) .
Within the public choice theory and based on the premise of a low citizen involvement, in the case of Croatia, the role of incumbents could be the most important factor (Lowi, 1972; Cullis & Jones, 1997; McLean, 1997; Roemer, 2001 ). This paper assumes that incumbents carry at least some responsibility for the underperforming OLBIs in Croatia. With respect to Ferejohn's model, due to their on average smaller budgets and thus lower rent extractions, municipalities should exhibit lower OLBIs. Richer LG, mostly cities, should pay more attention to BT.
Additionally, it seems that the annual efforts of the IPF in making the OLBI results publicly visible by rewarding the most transparent LGs affects the incumbents' attitudes and increases OLBI results, i.e., neo-institutional theory provides a valid explanation with respect to increases in the average values of OLBI.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
According to Pérez, Bolívar, and Hernández (2008) , the incentives for disclosure of public financial information can be political (e.g., political competition, political culture), social (e.g., socio-economic level, population size), institutional/administrative (e.g., size of the government, staff characteristics) and economic or financial (e.g., debt or the cost of debt).
This investigation focuses on articles related to local budget/fiscal transparency, particularly those related to online BT. Table 1 presents selected works addressing the determinants of online BT and similar transparency indexes on the regional/ local government level.
One can conclude that first, there is both national and regional/local-level BT research, but mostly focusing on developed countries, rarely on post-socialist countries. Second, regional/local BT research focuses mostly on fiscally decentralized countries (e.g., the United States and Spain), in most cases ignoring fiscally centralized countries. Third, although there are still no clearly identified determinants of LGs' BT, some variables have emerged as potentially more probable: GDP/ income p.c. (depending on the national or regional level), political ideology, political competition, population, debt and the cost of debt. Based on the literature review and the researchers' own reasoning, four hypotheses are proposed.
(1) Residents' p.c. income has a statistically significant and positive effect on the OLBI.
Residents with higher incomes expect more public services, demand more information (Giroux & McLelland, 2003; Piotrowski & van Ryzin, 2007) and have more access to and experience in using the Internet (Styles & Tennyson, 2007) . Ferejohn (1999) also argues that agents' discipline shows a positive correlation with the size of the budget under the threat of being replaced in elections if s/he acts otherwise.
(2) The political ideology of the governing party has a statistically significant influence on the OLBI.
This study expects a negative and significant effect for right--wing parties and a positive and significant effect for left-wing parties. Due to their bias towards expanding public services, left-wing parties/incumbents face greater transparency requirements and are more transparent (Caamaño-Alegre, Lago-Peñas, Reyes-Santias, & Santiago-Boubeta, 2013; Guillamón, Bastida, & Benito, 2011 ). Ferejohn's (1999 principal-agent model explains this through incumbents' rent extraction which leads to larger budgets and above zero transparency. Sol (2013) also argues that left-wing governments are more sensitive to the provision of transparency than right-wing governments.
(3) Population has a statistically significant and positive effect on the OLBI.
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The pressure to be transparent is greater in larger than in smaller cities/municipalities (Serrano-Cinca, Rueda-Tomás, & Portillo-Tarragona, 2009) because the larger ones provide services to a higher population, resulting in greater demand and the need for more disclosure of information (Styles & Tennyson, 2007) . Also, LGs with more residents must respond to greater external pressures and thus are more likely to adopt BT practices that are considered legitimate and socially acceptable (neo-institutional theory). Furthermore, larger cities generally have higher budgets for information technology (IT) services and can have better websites. With larger administrative staff, larger LGs can more easily meet transparency requirements (Caamaño-Alegre et al., 2013) .
(4) Political competition variables have a statistically significant and positive effect on the OLBI.
This study expects two political competition variablesincumbent faced more than one competitor in elections and incumbent was backed by more than one party -to be positively associated with BT. In the latter case, according to McLean (1997) , a higher number of parties in a coalition does not mean low competition overall; it is just transferred from the public sphere within the coalition itself. With little political competition, politicians have high expectations of remaining in power, tend to be less transparent and to ignore their electoral promises (Araujo & Tejedo-Romero, 2016; Gandía & Archidona, 2008; García & García, 2008) . Legitimacy theory argues that greater political competition leads to the voluntary demonstration of incumbents' efficient management (Alcaide Muñoz et al., 2017). Agency theory states that higher political competition is an incentive for the incumbents to perform well (to respond to the interests of citizens -Araujo & Tejedo-Romero, 2016; Pérez et al., 2014) .
The descriptions of the variables and data sources used in the empirical part of the paper are presented in Table 2 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Based on the stochastic process theory, the natural model for count data such as the dependent variable in this study (OLBI) is a Poisson distribution. This applies regardless of whether the dependent variable exhibits equidispersion (the variance equals the mean) or overdispersion (the variance is greater than the mean). 1 Table 3 The analysis was conducted on the 2015 and 2016 data, separately for each year, as it was not feasible to use a panel model. First, the level of OLBI is uniquely determined for each LG, i.e., it exhibits time-invariant characteristics. Inter-annual variability with panel data would mean that a fixed-effect model is the best option, but because there were no elections in these two years, all the political variables together with the data for the level of education of mayor/municipality head would be lost. Thus, the optimal strategy was to use regression analysis separately for each year to determine whether the same results are obtained. Based on a literature review and the researchers' own assumptions, a number of economic, political and socio-cultural variables were collected, some of which were used for testing the hypotheses and others as control variables. Although only the variables that were statistically significant were singled out in the model (Table 2) Political variables ideological stance of the incumbent (ideo_r -the ruling party in LG is the right-wing Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) or a coalition in which HDZ participates), political competition I -incumbent faced more than one competitor in elections (NoCand_2013) and political competition II -incumbent was backed by more than one party (Coal_2013).
637

Socio-cultural variables low level of education of the mayor/municipality head, indicating only a secondary school diploma (edu_l) and logarithm of LG's population (ln_pop).
Based on the correlation matrix, a number of variables did not show statistically significant effects and were not used, although these results are available upon request. The analysis was conducted on the total 'population' (cities and municipalities) and then separately for municipalities and cities. Table  4 presents the descriptive statistics for all the independent variables used in all three samples.
The estimated model comprises two economic (ln_income_ p.c. and ln_tc_p.c.) , three political (ideo_r, NoCand_2013 and Coal_2013) and two socio-cultural variables (ln_pop and edu_l).
A Poisson regression equation with robust standard errors was estimated for each sample, which is represented by the following equation:
where α 0 indicates a constant, and β i , i=1,2…7 indicates the estimated coefficients of the independent variables. The economic independent variables have a one-year lag, i.e., the OLBI in 2015 is explained by the 2014 logarithm of residents' average income p.c. (OLBI is calculated in the first quarter of the year, i.e., it is determined by events in the previous year much more than events in the current year). All political variables and the level of education of the mayor/municipality head are derived from the local elections held in 2013. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The results are presented in Table 5 . 2 The results for the total sample (cities+municipalities) confirm all four hypotheses. Each variable has a significant and expected effect: positive for ln_income_p.c., ln_pop and Coal_2013 and negative for ideo_r. Because the obtained results are confirmed for both years, one can state that they are valid for both years. Principal-agent theory provides a theoretical rationale for the positive effect of the ln_income_p.c. It is in the incumbents' interest to disclose the budget and show citizens how successfully they are managing their funds, if they want to stay in office (Alcaide Muñoz et al., 2017; Ferejohn, 1999) .
The positive impact of the ln_pop variable is supported by the neo-institutional theory. Higher number of inhabitants results in greater external pressures on the LG that leads to socially acceptable BT practices.
Legitimacy and principal-agent theory, which argue that greater political competition is an incentive for the incumbent to perform well, are confirmed by the positive effect of Coal_2013 on the OLBI.
In line with Ferejohn's model, left-wing governments defending larger budgets have incentives to choose above zero transparency, and thus the negative effect of ideo_r on the OLBI is expected. Furthermore, an increase in total expenditures p.c. as suggested by Ferejohn's model leads to higher OLBI scores in 2016.
The variable edu_l has a negative sign, but it is not statistically significant. The negative relationship between incumbents' having a secondary school diploma and the OLBI is expected because a secondary school diploma is the lowest possible level of an incumbent's education. This is in line with Tavares & Ferreira da Cruz (2014) , who also found a positive relationship between incumbents' education levels and transparency scores.
Comparing the results for 2015 and 2016, for the total sample, the strength and order of the variables are unchanged. This applies equally for the economic, political and level of education of the mayor/municipality head variables. For both 2015 (0.412) and 2016 (0.259), residents' ln_income_p.c . is the most important determinant of the OLBI. A positive correlation between residents' income and BT has also been found by Serrano-Cinca et al. (2009) and Styles and Tennyson (2007) , and on the national level by Ingram (1984) .
Ln_pop has the second highest impact on the OLBI in 2015 (0.191) and in 2016 (0.164) , thus confirming the majority of other authors' findings (e.g., Alcaide Muñoz et al., 2017; Gallego-Álvarez, Rodríguez-Domínguez, & García-Sánchez, 2010; García & García, 2008; Guillamón et al., 2011; Serrano--Cinca et al., 2009; Sol, 2013; Styles & Tennyson, 2007) .
Positive effect for the variable Coal_2013 indicates that a coalition candidate has on average a positive effect (0.123) on the OLBI, which is also confirmed in 2016 (0.144). This positive effect was also found by García and García (2008) , Araujo and Tejedo-Romero (2016) and Esteller-Moré and Otero (2012) .
If the incumbent is a right-wing politician (ideo_r), the OLBI, on average, decreases by 0. This result is consistent with the findings of the effect of partisanship on the local-level BT (e.g., Araujo & Tejedo-Romero, 2016; Caamaño-Alegre et al., 2013; Guillamón et al., 2011; Sol, 2013) .
Thus, all four hypotheses have been confirmed for the total sample, but they could be only partially accepted on the city and municipality levels. Analysing the samples at the level of cities and municipalities, the first conclusion was rather straightforward and expected. According to Ferejohn's model, one would expect that due to the wealth effect in the city sample, residents' income p.c. would have a positive impact on the OLBI. Since this effect is confirmed for the total sample, it must originate from either the city or municipality level. Following the same logic, since the importance of the political variables was confirmed for the total sample and they did not show statistically significant effects for the city sample, it is reasonable to expect them to originate within the municipality sample. This is also in line with the theoretical predictions of Ferejohn's model due to lower rents and ideological stance of the incumbent.
The estimated models for cities indicate that the only significant variable was ln_income_p.c. The last sample comprises 428 municipalities, and the results for 2015 suggest that the only statistically significant effect comes from the variable ideo_r (-0.174). For 2016, political (ideo_r with -0.137 and Coal_2013 with 0.129) and socio-cultural variables (ln_pop with 0.167) have a statistically significant effect. It seems that on this level, BT is a question of political will to distinguish oneself from the competition, and as Sol (2013) argues, left-wing LGs are more sensitive to the provision of transparency than right-wing LGs. For both years, a negative effect is found for a right-wing incumbent, thus confirming that the political effect captured for the total sample is actually driven by the municipalities and that the main driving force at this level is the incumbents' ideological stance. If the incumbent is a member of the right-wing Croatian party (HDZ) or a coalition in which the HDZ participates, the OLBI is on average lower.
CONCLUSIONS
This study contributes to the growing body of literature on LG BT determinants. Clear and robust evidence indicates that average p.c. residents' income is the most important determinant of the OLBI at the level of the total sample, followed by population, political competition and the incumbent's ideology.
Average p.c. residents' income is the most important driver at the level of cities, whereas at the municipality level, ide-ology matters. Principal-agent theory provides a theoretical rationale for the positive effect of average p.c. residents' income on the OLBI; the incumbents are willing to publish budget documents in order to stay in power in better-off cities. The neo-institutional theory is confirmed through the positive effect of population in all samples. As residents' income p.c. and population may act as a proxy for the institutional capacity of an LG in the total and city samples (i.e., the combination of the administrative and fiscal capacity of LGs), the results point to the necessity of reconsidering having numerous small LGs since they might lack the institutional capacity to address basic issues (such as maintaining adequate websites and publishing budget documents online).
At the municipality level, greater political competition results in higher BT and the voluntary demonstration of incumbents' efficient management, which falls under legitimacy and the principal-agent theory. In low administrative and fiscal capacity surroundings, BT becomes more of a question of political will, and a left-wing LG might be more sensitive to the provision of BT.
As it is necessary to motivate citizens to demand and LGs to offer more BT, it seems that the IPF's ratings of LGs acted as an incentive for many incumbents to increase their BT due to political competition among them.
For the time being, the lack of data and the short time span of study prevented the use of a more sophisticated econometric method. Future research might use random or fixed (given the possible political and socio-economic data) effects panel data models; examine the effect of the debt, access to Internet, etc., or try to identify a proxy for institutional capacity.
3 Interaction variables were created by multiplying the economic variable (ln_tc_p.c.) by the incumbent's ideological stance. The obtained results for ln_tc_r_p.c. also confirm that an increase in total expenditures when the party/coalition in power is the HDZ results in a decrease in the OLBI in 2015 and in 2016. Results are available upon request.
